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Abstract
Twitter has become a major source of data for
social media researchers. One important as-
pect of Twitter not previously considered are
deletions – removal of tweets from the stream.
Deletions can be due to a multitude of reasons
such as privacy concerns, rashness or attempts
to undo public statements. We show how dele-
tions can be automatically predicted ahead of
time and analyse which tweets are likely to be
deleted and how.
1 Introduction
In recent years, research on Twitter has attracted a
lot of interest, primarily due to its open API that
enables easy collection of data. The belief that
tweets contain useful information has lead to them
being used to predict many real-world quantities.
For example, tweets have been used to predict elec-
tions (Tumasjan et al., 2010; O’Connor et al., 2010),
stock market movement (Bollen et al., 2011), and even
flu outbreaks (Ritterman et al., 2009). Twitter forbids
distribution of raw tweets and their terms of service in-
sist that any tweet collection must honor post-hoc dele-
tion requests. That is, at any point in the future a user
can issue a request to Twitter to delete a tweet. Predict-
ing when a tweet is likely to be retracted by a user has
important applications:
• Security. Twitter has become so ubiquitous that
users often do not consider the potential confiden-
tiality implications before they tweet.
• Regret. Users might post an inappropriate or of-
fensive tweet in the heat of the moment, only to
regret it later.
• Public scrutiny. High profile politicians at times
tweet content that they later withdraw.
Here we report on the first results of automatically pre-
dicting if tweets will be deleted in the future. We also
analyse why tweets are deleted.
2 Related Work
Predicting deleted messages has been
previously addressed in the context of
emails (Dabbish et al., 2003; Dabbish et al., 2005).
For example, (Dabbish et al., 2003) found that the
most important factors affecting the chances of an
email being deleted are the past communication be-
tween the two parties and the number of recipients of
the email. However, it should be clear that people use
tweets in very different ways to using email. The most
similar work to ours is the recent analysis of censorship
in Chinese social media (Bamman et al., 2012). The
problem examined there is that of the government
deleting posts in the Chinese social media site Sina
Weibo (Chinese equivalent of Twitter). The authors
analyze different terms that are indicative of a tweet
being deleted and the difference between appearance
of certain political terms on Twitter and on Sina Weibo.
However, they make no attempt to predict what will be
deleted and only briefly touch upon deleted messages
in Twitter. While the main reason for deletion in Sina
Weibo seems to be government censorship,1 there is
no known censorship on Twitter, and thus the reasons
for deletion will be quite different. To the best of our
knowledge, we present the first analysis of deleted
messages on Twitter.
3 Task Description
There are several ways in which a tweet can be deleted.
The most obvious way is when its author explicitly
deletes it (this is usually done by clicking on a Delete
button available in most Twitter clients). Another way
that a tweet becomes effectively deleted is when a user
decides to make his tweets protected. Although the
user’s tweets are still available to read for his friends,
no one else has access to them any more (unless the
user decides to make them public again). Finally, the
user’s whole account might be deleted (either by their
own choice or by Twitter), meaning that all of his
tweets are also deleted. In the public streaming API,
Twitter does not differentiate between these different
scenarios, so we collapse them all into a single task:
for each tweet predict if it will be deleted, by either of
the aforementioned ways.
1These results were also confirmed in (Tschang, 2012).
3.1 Example Deleted Tweets
Table 1 shows some examples of the various types of
deleted tweets that we have discussed (identifiable in-
formation has been replaced by ***). Although we
can never be sure of the true reason behind someone
deleting a tweet, a lot of the time the reason is fairly
obvious. For example, it is very likely that tweet 1
was deleted because the author regretted posting it due
to its somewhat inappropriate content. On the other
hand, tweet 2 was most likely posted by a spammer
and got deleted when the author’s account was deleted.
Tweet 3 is probably an example of deleting a tweet
out of privacy concerns – the author posted his email
publicly which makes him an easy target for spam-
mers. The fourth tweet is an example of a deleted tweet
authored by a Canadian politician (obtained from the
website politwitter.ca/page/deleted). Fi-
nally, tweet 5 is an example of a false rumour on Twit-
ter. This tweet was retweeted many times right after it
was posted, but once it became clear that the news was
not true, many users deleted their retweets.
4 Predicting when Tweets will be Deleted
We now show the extent to which tweet deletion can be
automatically predicted.
4.1 Data
We use tweets collected from Twitter’s streaming API
during January 2012. This data consists of 75 million
tweets, split into a training set of 68 million tweets and
a test set of about 7.5 million more recent tweets (cor-
responding roughly to tweets written during the last
three days of January 2012). A tweet is given the la-
bel 1, meaning it was deleted, if the notice about its
deletion appeared in the streaming API at any time up
to 29th February 2012. Otherwise we consider that the
tweet was not deleted. In total, 2.4 million tweets in
our dataset were deleted before the end of February.
4.2 Features
We use the following features for this task:
• Social features: user’s number of friends, follow-
ers, statuses (total number of tweets written by a
user), number of lists that include the user, is the
user verified, is the tweet a retweet, is the tweet
a reply. Additionally, we include the number of
hashtags, mentions, and links in the tweet under
social features, even though they are not strictly
“social”. We do this because these features are
dense, and thus much more similar to other dense
features (the “real” social features) than to sparse
features like the author and text features.
• Author features: user IDs,
• Text features: all the words in the tweet.
Because of the user IDs and lexical features, the fea-
ture set we use is fairly large. In total, we have over
47 million features, where 18 million features are user
IDs, and the rest are lexical features (social features ac-
count for only about a dozen of features). We do not
use features like user’s time zone or the hour when the
tweet was written. This is because our preliminary ex-
periments showed that these features did not have any
effect on prediction performance, most likely because
the author and text features that we use already account
for these features (e.g., authors in different time zones
will use different words, or tweets written late at night
will contain different words from those written in the
morning).
4.3 Learning Algorithm
In all our experiments we use a support vector machine
(SVM) (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995) implemented in Li-
blinear (Fan et al., 2008). We note that while SVMs
are generally found to be very effective for a wide
range of problems, they are not well suited to large-
scale streaming problems. A potential limitation is
the fact that they require batch training, which can
be prohibitive both in terms of space and time when
dealing with large datasets. Because of this, we also
explored the use of the passive-aggressive (PA) algo-
rithm (Crammer et al., 2006), which is an efficient, on-
line, max-margin method for training a linear classifier.
Thus, we also present results for PA as an alternative
for cases where the data is simply too big for an SVM
to be trained.
4.4 Results
We formulate predicting deletions as a binary classi-
fication task – each tweet is assigned a label 0 (will
not be deleted) or 1 (will be deleted). Because the two
classes are not equally important, i.e., we are normally
more interested in correctly predicting when something
will be deleted than correctly predicting when some-
thing will not be deleted, we use the F1 score to mea-
sure performance. F1 score is standard, e.g., in infor-
mation retrieval, where one class (relevant documents)
is more important than the other.
Results are shown in Table 2. The random baseline
randomly assigns one of the two labels to every tweet,
while the majority baseline always assigns label 1 (will
be deleted) to every tweet. We can see from the abso-
lute numbers that this is a hard task, with the best F1
score of only 27.0. This is not very surprising given that
there are many different reasons why a tweet might be
deleted. Additionally, we should keep in mind that we
work on all of the crawled data, which contains tweets
in nearly all major languages, making the problem even
harder (we are trying to predict whether a tweet writ-
ten in any language will be deleted). Still, we can see
that the machine learning approach beats the baselines
by a very large margin (this difference is statistically
significant at p = 0.01). Further improving perfor-
1 Another weekend without seeing my daughters-now if I’d shot my ex when we split I would of been out by now,
missed opportunity :(
2 Get more followers my best friends? I will follow you back if you follow me - http://***
3 @*** yeah man email the contract to ***@gmail.com . . . This has been dragged out too long big homie
4 Gov must enforce the Air Canada Act and save over 2,500 jobs. @*** http://*** #ndpldr
5 BREAKING: URGENT: News spreading like wildfire, BASHAR AL-ASSAD HAS ESCAPED #SYRIA!
We’re waiting for a confirmation
Table 1: Examples of tweets that have been deleted.
F1
Random baseline 5.8
Majority baseline 6.0
All features (SVM) 27.0
All features (PA) 22.8
Social features 3.8
Lexical features 10.9
User IDs 12.2
Table 2: Results for predicting deleted tweets.
mance in this task will be the focus of future work and
this should enable researchers to distribute more stable
Twitter datasets.
We mentioned before that using an SVM might be
prohibitive when dealing with very large datasets. We
therefore compared it to the PA algorithm and found
that PA achieves an F1 score of 22.8, which is 4.2
points lower than the SVM (this difference is signif-
icant at p = 0.01) However, the SVM’s gain in per-
formance might be offset by its additional computa-
tional cost – PA took 3 minutes to converge, compared
to SVM’s 8 hours, and its memory footprint was two
orders of magnitude smaller. Because efficiency is not
our primary concern here, in the rest of the paper we
will only present results obtained using SVM, but we
note that the results for PA showed very similar pat-
terns.
To get more insight into the task, we look at how
different feature types affect performance. We can
see from the last three rows of Table 2 that social
features alone achieve very poor performance. This
is in contrast to other tasks on Twitter, where so-
cial features are usually found to be very helpful
(e.g., (Petrovic´ et al., 2011) report F1 score of 39.6 for
retweet prediction using only social features). Lex-
ical features alone achieved reasonable performance,
and the best performance was achieved using user ID
features. This suggests that some users delete their
tweets very frequently and some users almost never
delete their tweets, and knowing this alone is very help-
ful. Overall, it is clear that there is benefit in using
all three types of features, as the final performance is
much higher than performance using any single feature
group.
We performed ablation experiments where we re-
moved social features from the full set of features one
at a time and measured the change in performance. We
found that the only two features that had an impact
greater than 0.1 in F1 were the number of tweets that
the user has posted so far (removing this feature de-
creasedF1 by 0.2), and is the tweet a retweet (removing
this feature decreased F1 by 0.16). This is interesting
because the number of statuses is usually not found to
be helpful for other prediction tasks on Twitter, while
the followers number is usually a very strong feature,
and removing it here only decreased F1 by 0.07.
The number of followers a user has is often
considered one of the measures of her popularity.
While it is certainly not the only one or the “best”
one (Cha et al., 2010), it is still fairly indicative of the
user’s popularity/influence and much easier to collect
than other ones (e.g., number of mentions). In the next
experiment, we are interested in seeing how well our
system predicts what popular users (those with at least
a certain number of followers) will delete. In addition,
we look at how well our system works for verified users
(celebrities). Arguably, predicting whether a celebrity
or a user with 10,000 followers will delete a tweet is
a much more interesting task than predicting if a user
with 3 followers will do so. To do this, we run ex-
periments where we only train and test on those users
with the number of followers in a certain range, or only
on those users that are verified. We can see from Ta-
ble 3 that the situation between groups is very differ-
ent. While for users with less than 1,000 followers the
performance goes down, our system does much better
on users that have lots of followers (it is also interesting
to note that the baseline is much higher for users with
more followers, which means that they are more likely
to delete tweets in the first place). In fact, for users
with more than 10,000 followers our system achieves
very good performance that it could actually be applied
in a real scenario. For celebrities, results are somewhat
lower, but still much higher than for the whole training
set.
5 Why are tweets deleted?
One of the fundamental questions concerning deleted
tweets is why are they deleted in the first place. Is it
the case that most of the deletion notices that we see
in the stream are there because users deleted their ac-
counts? Or is it the case that most of the deleted tweets
User group Here Baseline # in test set
Followers < 1, 000 17.8 5.8 6.8M
Followers ∈ [1k, 10k] 33.7 6.6 640k
Followers ∈ [10k, 100k] 66.0 17.7 50k
Followers > 100, 000 86.4 41.5 5.5k
Celebrities 39.5 6.0 3.5k
Table 3: F1 score for different groups of users. The
third column shows our results for named groups. The
last column shows the number of users in the test set
that fall into each category.
come from active Twitter users who change their mind
about posting a tweet (for one reason or another)? Or
are tweets deleted by Twitter because they are sent by
spammers? Here we try to answer these questions by
looking at profiles of users who deleted tweets.
We take the 200000 deleted tweets from the test set
and query Twitter’s API to retrieve the account status of
their author. There are three possible outcomes: the ac-
count still exists, the account exists but it is protected,
or the account does not exist any more. Deleted tweets
from the first type of user are tweets that users manu-
ally delete and are probably the most interesting case
here. Deleted tweets from users who have made their
accounts protected are probably not really deleted, but
are only available to read for a very small group of
users. The third case involves users who have had their
entire accounts deleted and thus none of their tweets
are available any more. While it is possible for a user
to delete his account himself, it is much more likely
that these users are spammers and have had their ac-
counts deleted by Twitter. Statistics about these three
types of deletions are shown in Table 4. Most of the
deleted tweets are genuine deletions rather than a con-
sequence of deleting spammers, showing that there is
much more to predicting deletions than simply predict-
ing spam tweets.
Given this classification of deletions, we are inter-
ested in finding out how our approach performs across
these different groups. Is it the case that some deletions
are easier to predict than others? In order to answer this
question, we test the performance of our system on the
deleted tweets from these three groups. Because each
of the three test sets now contains only positive exam-
ples, we measure performance in terms of accuracy in-
stead of F1 score. Note also that in this case accuracy is
the same as recall. The third column of Table 4 shows
that i) predicting deletions that are a result of deleted
accounts (i.e., spotting spammers) is much easier than
predicting genuine deletions, and ii) predicting which
tweets will become protected is the hardest task.
Our manual analysis of the tweets discovered that a
lot of deleted tweets contained curse words, leading us
to examine the relationship between cursing and dele-
tion in more detail. Curse words are known to express
negative emotions (Jay, 2009), which lead us to hypoth-
Deletion type % of tweets in test set Accuracy
Manual deletion 85.2 18.8
Protected 12.2 17.5
Account deleted 2.6 29.5
Table 4: Proportion of different types of deletions and
performance of our algorithm across these types.
esize that tweets which contain curse words are more
likely to be deleted. In order to test this hypothesis,
we calculate the probabilities of a tweet being deleted
conditioned on whether it contains a curse word. We
use a list of 68 English curse words, and only consider
English tweets from the test set. We find that the prob-
ability of deletion given that the tweet contains a curse
word is 3.73%, compared to 3.09% for tweets that do
not contain curse words. We perform a two-sample z-
test and find that the difference is statistically signifi-
cant at p = 0.0001, which supports our hypothesis.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a new task: predicting which mes-
sages on Twitter will be deleted in the future. We pre-
sented an analysis of the deleted messages on Twitter,
providing insight into the different reasons why people
delete tweets. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to conduct such an analysis. Our analysis showed,
e.g., that tweets which contain swear words are more
likely to be deleted. Finally, we presented a machine
learning approach and showed that for certain groups
of users it can predict deleted messages with very high
accuracy.
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